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THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK 
PRODUCT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE FOR THE 
CORPORATE CLIENT 
Nancy C. Codyt 
Corporate counsel are charged with the task of protecting infor-
mation relayed to them or compiled at the behest of a client. This 
article examines problems encountered by corporate counsel at-
tempting to invoke the attorney-client privilege or work product 
immunity doctrine to protect information. The author recom-
mends that corporate counsel implement procedures designed to 
retain confidentiality and remain abreast of modifications in 
case law pertaining to attorney-client privilege and work product 
immunity. The confidentiality of corporate information is best 
preserved by adherence to an organized system of procedures for 
gathering information. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the day-to-day activities of corporate counsel, the attorney-client 
privilege and the work product immunity doctrine are seldom of more 
than peripheral concern. Attorneys for corporations, whether corporate 
employees or outside counsel, communicate freely with company direc-
tors, officers, and employees under the assumption that the contents of 
such communications, resulting memoranda, and reports will remain 
confidential. Should the matters under discussion become the subject of 
litigation, however, application of the attorney-client privilege and the 
work product immunity doctrine is not as automatic or comprehensive 
as counsel might expect. 
Court rulings concerning the attorney-client and work product priv-
ileges identify recurring pitfalls for counsel when these doctrines are in-
voked in corporate litigation. A voidance of these pitfalls requires 
awareness and advance planning. Counsel should establish procedures 
for obtaining information and providing legal services that maximize the 
client's ability to protect confidential communications from disclosure in 
subsequent litigation. This article examines the status of the attorney-
client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine in the corporate 
setting and offers practical suggestions to assist corporate counsel in their 
efforts to avoid loss or waiver of the protections these legal principles 
afford corporate clients. 
t B.A., College of Mount St. Joseph, 1978; J.D., University of Cincinnati College of 
Law, 1981; Associate, Dinsmore & Shohl, Cincinnati, Ohio. 
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND WORK 
PRODUCT IMMUNITY PRIVILEGES 
Reliance on the advice of counsel enables both corporations and in-
dividuals to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. When 
legal proceedings arise, the adversary system anticipates that attorneys 
for each side will prepare their cases thoroughly and independently, 
without taking unfair advantage of their opponent's trial preparation. 
The attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine 
are intended to advance these legal and social aims. In practice, both the 
attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine protect 
the privacy between a client and his attorney, which promotes the candid 
exchange of information that is necessary to develop a comprehensive 
litigation strategy. 
A. Attorney-Client Privilege 
Confidentiality for attorney-client communications is one of the old-
est testimonial privileges recognized at common law. l Modern develop-
ment of this rule in case law reflects the practical purpose of the attorney-
client privilege: to promote clients' freedom of consultation with legal 
advisors. 2 In order to provide their clients with competent representa-
tion, attorneys must be advised fully regarding their clients' circum-
stances. Clients, on the other hand, cannot entrust their problems to their 
attorneys without some assurance against compulsory disclosure of such 
information. 
Although the attorney-client privilege originated in the common 
law,3it is codified in specific statutes in numerous jurisdictions.4 The 
classic formulation of the attorney-client privilege is set forth in United 
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.:5 
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the privi-
lege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the 
communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, 
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communica-
1. Kelway v. Kelway, 21 Eng. Rep. 47 (Ch. 1580); Waldron v. Ward, 82 Eng. Rep. 853 
(K.B. 1654). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2990, at 542-43 (Mc-
Naughton rev. ed. 1961). Maryland follows the common law in granting clients a 
privilege against disclosure of communications with their attorneys. Trupp v. Wolff, 
24 Md. App. 588, 335 A.2d 171 (1975). 
2. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); see also 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE ~ 26.606 (2d ed. 1984). 
3. J. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 204-42 (3d ed. 1984). 
4. See, e.g., ALASKA R. EVID. 503; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2234 (1982); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4062 (1978); ARK. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; CAL. EVID. CODE 
§§ 950-62 (West 1966); DEL. UNIF. R. EVID. 502; HAWAII R. EVID. 503; ME. R. 
EVID. 502; MICHIGAN G.C.R. 1963, Rule 306.2; NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 49.035-
49.115 (1971); N.M.R. EVID. 503; ORE. REV. STAT. § 40.225 (1981); TEX. R. 
EVID. 503; VT. R. EVID. S02; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.03 (West 1975). 
S. 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). 
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tion is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a 
fact of which the attorney was informed (a) by his client 
(b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of se-
curing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal serv-
ices or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for 
the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege 
has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 
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In short, where legal advice is sought from a professional legal advisor in 
his capacity as such, the communications relevant to that purpose, made 
in confidence by the client, are at the instance of the client permanently 
protected from disclosure, unless the protection is waived. 6 
B. Work Product Immunity Doctrine 
In the landmark case of Hickman v. Taylor,7 an action for the 
wrongful death of a seaman in a tug boat accident, the United States 
Supreme Court established a qualified immunity from discovery for 
materials prepared by or for an attorney in anticipation of litigation or in 
preparation for trial. 8 The plaintiffs in Hickman attempted to compel the 
production of statements that the tug owners' attorney, with an eye to-
ward future litigation, had taken from witnesses shortly after the acci-
dent.9 The Supreme Court, interpreting the discovery provisions in the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, \0 held the statements privileged, citing 
the general policy against invading the privacy of an attorney's trial prep-
aration, II absent compelling reasons that justify such invasion. 12 
6. Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., 23 F.R.D. 281, 285 (D.N.Y. 1959). See generally 
C. WRIGHT & W. MILLER, 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2017 (1970) 
(discussing scope of attorney-client privilege). In the context of privilege, waiver can 
be inferred. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Peyton, 243 F. Supp. 907, 909 (E.D. Va. 1965) (client 
who challenged his attorney's conduct of his case was held to have waived the privi-
lege as to confidential communications with the attorney). 
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
8. Id. at 510-12. 
9. Id. at 498. 
10. In 1938, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expressly limited discovery in only 
two instances: 1) where the deposition was conducted in bad faith or in such a 
manner as to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the person subject to the inquiry, FED. 
R. CIV. P. 30(b); and 2) where the requested information touched upon irrelevant 
matters or encroached upon the recognized domains of privilege, FED. R. CIV. P. 
26(b). The Supreme Court, however, found that "the memoranda, statements, and 
mental impressions in issue in [Hickman fell] outside the scope of the attorney-client 
privilege and hence [were] not protected from discovery on that basis." 329 U.S. at 
507-08. 
11. The Court stated: 
Proper preparation of a client's case demands that [the attorney] assemble 
information, sift what he considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant 
facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and 
needless interference .... Were such materials open to opposing counsel 
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain 
unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his 
own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop 
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As presently codified in the Federal Civil Rules, the work product 
immunity doctrine is broader in scope than the attorney-client privilege. 
Fedetal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides: 
A party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things 
otherwise discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and 
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for an-
other party or by or for that other party's representative (in-
cluding his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or 
agent) only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery 
has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of his 
case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the 
substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In or-
dering discovery of such materials when the required showing 
has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the 
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of 
an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the 
litigation. 
Although the work product immunity doctrine and the attorney-
client privilege are closely related, there are significant differences in ap-
plication. For example, although "work product" may be that of an at-
torney, the concept of "work product" is not confined to information or 
materials gathered or assembled by a lawyer.I3 Furthermore, "a commu-
nication may be immune from discovery as work product even though it 
was not made to or by a client of an attorney."14 Unlike the attorney-
client privilege, however, work product immunity applies only to docu-
ments prepared in anticipation of litigation, not to documents prepared 
for ordinary business purposes. IS In addition, the work product immu-
nity doctrine may be defeated by a showing that the protected informa-
tion is crucial to the case and the same or substantially equivalent 
information cannot be obtained by the other side without undue hard-
in the giving of legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The 
effect on the legal profession would be demoralizing and the interests of 
the clients and the cause of justice would be poorly served. 
329 U.S. at 511. 
12. /d. at 512-14. 
13. The work product immunity doctrine also can apply to material such as deposition 
summaries prepared by paralegals, reports of private investigators hired by the at-
torney, indices to documents prepared by clerical personnel at the attorney's re-
quest, and similar items. See generally M. LARKIN, FEDERAL TESTIMONIAL 
PRIVILEGES § 11.02 & n.47 (1985). 
14. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 603 (8th Cir. 1977) (en banc). 
15. Cf lanicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648,650 (D.D.C. 1982) (safety 
records of minor accidents kept as a routine business matter to reduce risks to em-
ployees or to satisfy an insurance carrier may be considered ordinary business 
records, rather than work product, particularly if the records are not made upon 
advice of counselor are not kept confidential). As is evident from Janicker, the 
distinction between documents prepared in anticipation of litigation and documents 
prepared for an ordinary business purpose is not always an easy one to make. 
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ship.16 Moreover, like the attorney-client privilege, the protection af-
forded to work product documents can be waived. 17 
Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that if a 
court orders production of work product materials, the court "shall pro-
tect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions 
or legal theories of the attorney or other representative of a party con-
cerning the litigation." IS Some courts have held that such material enjoys 
a new absolute privilege; 19 other courts, however, simply have required a 
stronger showing of need and hardship to overcome the privilege.20 Be-
cause the Supreme Court has declined to resolve this conflict, 2 I work 
product containing such information as that ostensibly protected by Rule 
26(b)(3) remains at risk of disclosure. 
The application of Rule 26(b)(3) to work product generally requires 
in camera review of the documents sought to determine the applicability 
of the immunity doctrine and to protect privileged material from unwar-
ranted scrutiny. Even states that restrict the scope of work product im-
munity provide a privilege for "mental impression" work product.22 
Often, when work product documents are ordered disclosed pursuant to 
a finding of substantial need and undue hardship, it has been suggested 
that courts should permit material reflecting the attorney's thought 
processes to be redacted before the documents are produced to the oppo-
16. In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 809 n.59 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "Undue hardship" 
generally is considered something more than mere inconvenience or expense; it is 
found only when opposing counsel cannot obtain substantially equivalent informa-
tion elsewhere. /d. 
17. Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 1984); 
see infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text. 
18. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Examples of such material include documents reflecting 
an attorney's discovery plan, trial strategy, legal research and theories, and evalua-
tions of the strengths and weaknesses of an opponent's case. In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Dated Nov. 8, 1979, 622 F.2d 933 (6th Cir. 1980); In re Grand Jury 
Proceedings, 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade 
Comm'n, 598 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
19. See, e.g., In re Doe, 662 F.2d 1073, 1080 (4th Cir. 1981) (opinion work product 
enjoys near absolute immunity and can be discovered only in very rare and ex-
traordinary circumstances), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); In re Murphy, 560 
F.2d 326, 336 (8th Cir. 1977) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 412 F. Supp. 
943, 949 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (same). 
20. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (gov-
ernment unable to meet higher burden of need and hardship to compel corporation 
to produce employee interview memoranda); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. V. 
Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970) (good cause shown by plaintiffs seeking docu-
ment prepared by defendant's counsel following his client's testimony before a 
grand jury), affd, 400 U.S. 348 (1971) (Court equally divided); Xerox Corp. V. 
I.B.M., 64 F.R.D. 367, 377-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (plaintiff made sufficient showing of 
good cause where 23 key witnesses in trade secrets case were interviewed by defend-
ant but were not available for plaintiff to examine). 
21. Upjohn V. United States, 449 U.S. 383,401 (1981); see infra notes 40-48 and accom-
panying text. 
22. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 lOA, § 201(b)(2) (1979); PA. R. CIV. P. 4003.3. 
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nent. 23 For a communication or document to be privileged, it must re-
main confidential. Generally, when an attorney-client communication24 
or trial preparation materiaP5 is shared with an outsider the privilege is . 
destroyed. 
III. SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN APPLYING THE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK PRODUCT 
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE IN THE CORPORATE 
SETTING. 
In the corporate setting, unique problems arise regarding the appli-
cation of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity doc-
trine. Questions that are relatively simple in the context of individual 
representation often become much more complex in corporate practice. 
For example, in the representation of a corporation, the determination of 
who is the "client," is not always clear; nor is it always certain from 
whom confidential material may be withheld.26 Furthermore, the distinc-
tion between privileged legal advice or work done "in anticipation of liti-
gation" and unprivileged ordinary business communications is often 
quite subtle.27 Moreover, various actions engaged in by corporations are 
deemed to waive these protections, and such actions may affect the asser-
tion of the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doc-
trine by individual officers or directors regarding their communications 
with corporate counsel. 28 The corporation also is faced with the dilemma 
of maintaining forthright and cooperative relationships with federal regu-
latory agencies, while contemporaneously attempting to preserve the 
confidentiality necessary for the attorney-client privilege and work prod-
uct immunity doctrine.29 These concerns generally do not arise during 
the representation of individual clients. The interests of individual clients 
usually are identified easily and are not complicated by the involvement 
of numerous officers, employees, and agents. Moreover, privileges as-
23. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224, 1231 (3d Cir. 1979) (government 
agreed to redaction of opinion work product); see also Hodgson v. Keller Brass, 56 
F.R.D. 126 (1972) (extent to which attorney work product will be protected must be 
judged by court on an ad hoc basis). 
24. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727 F.2d 1352, 1357(4th Cir. 1984). 
25. Duplan Corp. v. Deering-Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215 (4th Cir. 1976). 
26. See infra notes 78-91 and accompanying text. 
27. See infra notes 115-21 and accompanying text. 
28. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 986 (1985) (new 
corporate management may waive attorney-client privilege as to communications 
made by former officers and directors); see also Lee Nat'l Corp. v. Deramas, 313 F. 
Supp. 224 (D. Del. 1970). 
29. To the extent these issues are not addressed in this article, the reader is referred to 
recent publications dealing with corporate privilege. Mathews, Internal Corporate 
Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655 (1984); Dorris, The Limited Waiver Rule: Crea-
tion of an SEC-Corporation Privilege, 36 STAN. L. REV. 789 (1984); Note, The Attor-
ney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go After UpJohn?, 81 
MICH. L. REV. 665 (1983); Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Consideration of the Corporate 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443 (1982). 
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serted by individual clients generally do not implicate fiduciary relation-
ships such as those between a corporation and its shareholders. 
Courts are reluctant to shield information from discovery and gener-
ally require a clear showing that the requirements of the privilege, in-
cluding absence of waiver, have been met.30 It is important to remember 
that evidentiary privileges are strictly construed,31 and that the burden of 
asserting and establishing the privileged nature of a document or com-
munication falls upon the party resisting discovery.32 Hence, protecting 
clients from the consequences of an adverse ruling on privilege is not an 
easy task. Corporate attorneys must acquaint themselves with the legal 
principles governing the attorney-client privilege and the work product 
immunity doctrine and adhere to practices that are most likely to result 
in maintaining privileged status for sensitive information. Because of the 
lack of concrete standards and direction from the Supreme Court, attor-
neys also need to keep abreast of changes in their jurisdiction's case law 
in this area. 33 
Successful assertion of the privilege for attorney-client communica-
tions and work product in the corporate setting requires attention to the 
factual circumstances surrounding the communications in question. If a 
district court finds that a privilege is being asserted in furtherance of a 
crime or fraud, for example, the privilege will not be upheld.34 If the 
communication sought to be protected appears to involve only ordinary 
business matters, as opposed to legal advice,assertion of privilege will 
not be upheld.35 Disclosing privileged material to outside parties ordinar-
ily waives the privilege.36 Any "testimonial use" of the material, such as 
providing privileged material to an expert witness during preparation for 
his deposition or trial testimony, also will result in a waiver.J7 Often, if a 
privilege applicable to certain subject matter is waived, courts will re-
quire disclosure to the opponent of all information relevant to that sub-
ject matter.38 The corporation's waiver of the privilege may have 
30. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979). "[B]ecause the privi-
lege obstructs the search for the truth and because its benefits are, at best, 'indirect 
and speculative,' it must be 'strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits 
consistent with the logic of its principle'. " 559 F.2d at 1224 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE 
ON EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961». 
31. Up john Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383,389 (1981); United States v. King, 536 
F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
32. Weil v. Investment/lndicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th 
Cir. 1981); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
33. See infra notes 40-54 and accompanying text. 
34. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept.15, 1983,731 F.2d 1032, 1038 
(2d Cir. 1984); In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 693 F.2d 1235, 
1242 (5th Cir. 1982). 
35. United States v. Davis, 636 F.2d 1028, 1039-40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 862 
(1981); Barr Marine Prod. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 631, 634 (E.D. Pa. 
1979). 
36. Detection Sys., Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). 
37. Computer Network Corp. v. Spohler, 95 F.R.D. 500, 502 (D. D.C. 1982). 
38. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 1146, 1162 (D.S.C. 1975) (vol-
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ramifications beyond the corporation itself. For example, waiver of the 
attorney-client privilege by the corporation may be held to waive the 
privilege as to individual employees' communications with corporate 
counsel. 39 The eventual result of waiver in subsequent civil or criminal 
litigation, of course, can have substantial impact on corporate liabilities 
and, ultimately, on the value of corporate shares and debt instruments. 
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF THE CORPORATE ATTORNEY-
CLIENT AND WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES IN 
CASE LAW 
A. The Supreme Court 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,4fJ the Supreme Court reaffirmed ap-
plication of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity 
doctrine to the rendition of legal services in the corporate setting. The 
Supreme Court held that the attorney-client privilege did not apply solely 
to communications between corporate counsel and the so-called "control 
group" of key corporate officers and executives authorized to act upon 
counsel's advice, a rule that had been adopted by a number of federal 
courtS.41 Instead, the Court held that the attorney-client privilege encom-
passes communications between corporate counsel and lower level em-
ployees when the employees are aware that the communication is 
undertaken to allow the corporation to obtain legal advice.42 Under 
Upjohn, a corporate employee's communication to corporate counsel, 
made at the direction of his superior regarding matters within the scope 
untary disclosure of one or more privileged documents passed between attorney and 
client waives the privilege as to all communications between the same attorney and 
client on the same subject matter). 
39. Citibank, N.A. v. Andros, 666 F.2d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub 
nom. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 105 S. Ct. 321 (1984); In 
re Grand Jury Investigation, 575 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
40. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). Upjohn involved a pharmaceutical firm's internal investigation 
of alleged overseas bribes to foreign governments. During the course of the investi-
gation, undertaken at the behest of the company's general counsel, low-level mana-
gerial employees were required to answer questionnaires concerning such payments. 
The IRS issued a summons demanding production of both the questionnaires and 
memoranda concerning employee interviews. Id. at 386-89. 
41. The so-called "control group" test first was articulated in City of Philadelphia v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa. 1962), petition jor man-
damus & prohibition denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 
742 (3d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963). The control group test gained 
a large following in subsequent decisions. In re Grand Jury Investigation, 599 F.2d 
1224 (3d Cir. 1979); Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968); Garrison v. 
General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963); In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena, 81 F.R.D. 691 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 
1979); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipping & Dry Dock, 68 F.R.D. 397 
(E.D. Va. 1975); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974); 
Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970); see also 
Mead Data Cent. v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 253 n.24 
(1977). 
42. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391-97. 
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of the employee's job responsibilities, constitutes a privileged attorney-
client communication. The Upjohn decision similarly affirmed that the 
work product immunity doctrine, set forth in Hickman v. Taylor43 and 
codified in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3), applies to docu-
ments generated by or on behalf of corporate counsel. The Upjohn deci-
sion makes it clear that "work product" refers not only to documents 
prepared by an attorney, but also to work done by others at counsel's 
direction in preparation for litigation.44 Work product materials that re-
flect an attorney's mental impressions, theories, and strategy concerning 
impending litigation may be withheld from discovery, despite the oppo-
nent's asserted need for such materials or the hardship resulting from 
nondisclosure.45 
Although clearly helpful to corporate counsel seeking to invoke the 
attorney-client privilege or the work product immunity doctrine, the 
Upjohn decision left a number of questions unanswered. In rejecting the 
"control group" standard, the majority refused to articulate a test for 
application of the corporate attorney-client privilege. Instead, the Upjohn 
majority expressly called for a case-by-case approach consistent with the 
ground rules set forth in Hickman, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 
and the Upjohn opinion.46 Moreover, the Court did not indicate what 
type or degree of "substantial need" or "undue hardship" must be shown 
to overcome a valid claim of work product protection for trial prepara-
tion materials.47 Although the majority opinion suggests that attorney 
work product reflecting mental impressions, theories, opinions, and liti-
gation strategy is absolutely privileged, the Court also left this issue open 
to further debate.48 
In summary, the Upjohn decision leaves corporate attorneys in an 
uncertain position. Communications with corporate employees and trial 
preparation efforts sought by the other side mayor may not be discover-
able, depending upon the attending circumstances and case law in indi-
vidual jurisdictions.49 
Since Upjohn, the Supreme Court has not refined the flexible stan-
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
44. 449 U.S. at 387-88. 
45. Id. at 401. The type of work product material subsumed under this general descrip-
tion is subject to considerable dispute. A distinction has been made between an at-
torney's mere recordation of observed facts and the "opinions of the attorney." 
Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 540 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (4th Cir. 1976); see 
also United States v. Capitol Serv., Inc., 89 F.R.D. 578, 585 (E.D. Wis. 1981). 
46. 449 U.S. at 396-97. 
47. Id. at 401-02. 
48. [d. 
49. For example, under Maryland case law, communications made by the client to a 
psychiatrist for the purpose of seeking legal advice are within the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege if the psychiatrist is retained to assist the attorney in rendering 
legal advice. Pratt v. State, 39 Md. App. 442, 387 A.2d 779 (1978). This privilege 
does not apply if the psychiatrist is consulted for treatment rather than to assist the 
attorney. [d. Such communications may not be considered within the attorney-cli-
ent privilege in other jurisdictions. 
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dards for application of the attorney-client privilege to corporations. In a 
recent decision, however, the Court limited the scope of work product 
immunity for materials generated in preparation for litigation. In United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co., 50 the Court held that a corporate taxpayer 
could not assert a privilege for the work product of an outside accounting 
firm employed by the corporation to assure compliance with federal se-
curities laws. The Second Circuit had given work product immunity to 
tax accrual papers that were prepared by the corporation's independent 
auditors and sought pursuant to an IRS subpoena. 51 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit held that the public interest in promoting 
full disclosure to public accountants, which in turn promoted the integ-
rity of the securities market, required that work such as that performed 
by independent auditors be protected. 52 
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that no ac-
countant-client privilege or work product immunity attached to the tax 
accrual work papers. The special duties undertaken by certified public 
accountants to protect the general public were found to transcend their 
employment relationship with the client. The Court noted that should 
the SEC or a private litigant seek access to such documents, "they would 
surely be entitled to do SO."53 The Court therefore held that the IRS also 
should have access to the material because the need for full disclosure to 
the government outweighed the interest in encouraging corporate clients 
to disclose to their independent accountants. 54 
The Arthur Young decision leaves corporations without work prod-
uct protection for "compliance assurance" audits conducted by public 
accountants. The decision leaves open the possibility, however, that the 
privilege will be preserved if such audits are conducted by in-house audi-
tors under the supervision of the corporations' general counsel. An alter-
native course of action that would preserve the privilege is for the 
corporation to hire an outside law firm to supervise the investigation and 
allow the law firm to retain its own accounting consultants. Use of these 
types of alternatives demonstrates more emphatically the litigation-re-
lated purpose of the accounting services and the nexus between the audits 
and the rendition of legal advice. Neither of these courses of action, how-
ever, will render the results of such audits confidential unless litigation is 
SO. 465 U.S. 80S (1984). 
51. 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), affd in part & rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 820 (1984). 
52. Id. at 220-21. 
53. 465 U.S. at 820; see Securities Act of 1933, § 19,48 Stat. 85,15 U.S.c. § 77s(b) (For 
purposes of "all necessary and proper" investigations, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission is empowered to "require the production of any books, papers, or other 
documents which the commission deems relevant or material to the inquiry."). 
54. 465 U.S. at 821. The court stated that, "[b]eyond question it is desirable and in the 
public interest to encourage full disclosure by corporate clients to their independent 
accountants; if it is necessary to balance competing interests, however, the need of 
the government for full disclosure ... must also weigh in the balance." Id. 
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foreseeable; routine audits for business unrelated to present or prospec-
tive legal actions will not be privileged. 
B. Recent Lower Court Decisions 
Lack of Supreme Court guidance has left the lower federal courts in 
disagreement as to the application of the attorney-client privilege and 
work product immunity doctrine in the corporate setting. Attempts by 
the lower federal courts to apply Upjohn to cases concerning the applica-
tion of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity doctrine 
to corporate parties have produced divergent results. 
1. Shareholder and Derivative Suits 
A controversial issue in recent years has been whether corporate 
managers can assert the attorney-client privilege or work product immu-
nity doctrine in shareholder and derivative suits. In these suits, typically 
one or more shareholders sue the corporation directly or institute pro-
ceedings against corporate management individually or "derivatively" as 
representatives of the corporation itself, challenging decisions that affect 
the company or the value of its stock. 55 At first blush, it seems anoma-
lous that the management of a corporation should have an evidentiary 
privilege to withhold from the corporation's shareholders information 
from attorneys who ostensibly are acting on the corporation's behalf. As 
a practical matter, however, both shareholder and derivative suits pit 
corporate management and the majority shareholders against an individ-
ual shareholder or a disgruntled minority of shareholders in a confronta-
tion where mutuality of the parties' interests has been destroyed. In view 
of this adversarial relationship, a corporation ordinarily is entitled to as-
sert attorney-client privilege and work product immunity against the 
plaintiff shareholders. 56 
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,57 the Fifth Circuit created a significant 
loophole in the corporate attorney-client privilege. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that if shareholders charge 
that corporate management is acting inimically to those shareholders' 
55. Shareholder derivative suits are creatures of state law and are subject to state proce-
dural rules. Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167, 169 (D. Conn. 1950). 
56. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103 (5th Cir. 1970), cerro denied, 401 U.S. 
974 (1971); see also Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholders'Suits, 
69 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1969) (criticizing the shareholder exception created by the 
federal district court in Garner V. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 
1968». 
57. 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971). The case 
involved a class action brought by shareholders against an insurance company and 
its officers alleging violations of federal and state securities law and common-law 
fraud. The shareholders attempted to recover the purchase price they and similarly 
situated shareholders had paid for their stock. The dissident shareholders sought to 
depose the attorney handling the corporation's issuance of stock. At issue was ad-
vice given by the attorney to the corporation concerning the stock and its sale. The 
shareholders also sought production of related legal documents. [d. at 1095. 
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interests, the availability of the attorney-client privilege is subject to the 
shareholders' right to show cause why the privilege should not be up-
held. 58 The Garner court reasoned that it was anomalous to allow the 
privilege automatically under all circumstances, because the corpora-
tion's attorneys ultimately are supposed to act on the shareholders' be-
half. 59 In ruling on privilege claims in derivative or shareholder suits, the 
Garner court found these factors relevant: 
1) the colorable nature of the shareholder's claim; 
2) the shareholder's good faith; 
3) the necessity or desirability for the shareholder to have the 
information; 
4) whether the information is available elsewhere; 
5) whether the claim alleges activity that is criminal, illegal, or of 
merely doubtful legality; 
6) whether the communication relates to past or prospective 
actions; 
7) whether the communication sought is related to the share-
holder's suit; 
8) the specificity of information sought (no fishing expeditions); 
and 
9) the risk of revealing trade secrets or other information the cor-
poration seeks to keep confidential for reasons extraneous to the 
litigation.6O 
Courts attempting to apply Garner have reached conflicting results, 
largely due to differing views on the weight that should be given to the 
competing interests and policies involved in such disputes. On occasion, 
lower courts deny application of. the attorney-client privilege, only to 
have the privilege reinstated on appeal. In Ohio-Sealy Mattress Manufac-
turing Co. v. Kaplan ,61 a class action and derivative antitrust suit, the 
district court reversed the magistrate's decision that the plaintiffs had 
established grounds for depriving the defendants of their attorney-client 
privilege.62 In its decision, the district court relied upon the following 
facts: 1) plaintiffs' representation of fewer than one percent of Sealy'S 
shares; 2) the information sought by the plaintiffs pertained to past con-
duct, not to the shareholder litigation; and 3) the disclosure of the infor-
mation could be used against the corporation in individual litigation 
between the plaintiffs and Sealy. 
58. Id. at 1103-04. 
59. Id. at 1101. 
60. Id. at 1103-04. 
61. 90 F.R.D. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1980), affd sub nom. Ohio-Sealy Mattress Mfg. Co. v. 
Sealy, Inc., 669 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 943 (1982). The plaintiff 
shareholders in Sealy, who held only 0.7 percent of Sealy shares, filed a class action 
antitrust suit challenging certain corporate actions involving corporate licensees. 
Id. at 23-25. 
62. Id. at 30-31. 
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Similarly, in In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Securities 
Litigation,63 shareholders' derivative and class action suits were brought 
against International Systems and Controls and its board of directors, 
alleging fraud and violations of federal securities laws.64 The United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas attempted to ex-
tend the good cause exception of Garner by ruling that plaintiffs could 
have access to certain work product materials produced by ISC attorneys 
in connection with an internal corporate investigation of questionable 
overseas payments.65 On appeal of the discovery order, the Fifth Circuit 
reversed, holding that once there is sufficient anticipation of litigation to 
trigger work product immunity, the mutuality of interest between dissi-
dent shareholders and corporate management is destroyed.66 Under such 
circumstances, the plaintiff shareholders cannot discover work product 
of corporate attorneys absent a showing of substantial need, undue hard-
ship, or both.67 
In the International Systems decision, the Fifth Circuit expressly de-
clined to extend the Garner holding to work product immunity.68 Failure 
to recognize that the "mutuality of interest" between shareholder and 
management ceases to exist in shareholder litigation, the court observed, 
"would be to ignore modern corporate realities. "69 Two parties anticipat-
ing litigation against each other do not have a common interest. It is not 
reasonable to indulge in the fiction that counsel, hired by management, 
also is hired constructively by the party against whom counsel is ex-
pected to defend.70 Furthermore, because the shareholders had not pro-
vided prima facie proof that fraudulent or criminal activity was 
underway in connection with preparation of the work product materials 
sought to be discovered, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit refused to require disclosure. 71 
Other courts also have limited the scope of Garner. In Weil v. In-
vestment/Indicators, Research & Management, Inc.,72 the Ninth Circuit 
held that Garner did not apply to a class action, other than a derivative 
suit, brought by someone other than a current corporate shareholder.?3 
63. 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1982). The case was a shareholder derivative suit alleging 
that company representatives paid illegal bribes in the form of "commissions" to 
foreign officials to secure contracts in the Middle East. Independent directors, an 
outside law firm, and the accounting firm of Arthur Young & Co. (the company's 
regular outside auditor) formed an internal "special audit committee" to investigate 
the payments. /d. at 1237. 
64. 693 F.2d at 1237. 
65. In re International Sys. & Controls Corp. Sec. Litig., 97 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 
1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1983). 
66. 693 F.2d at 1239. 
67. Id. at 1239-40. 
68. Id. at 1240. 
69. Id. at 1239. 
70.Id. 
71. Id. at 1242-43. 
72. 647 F.2d 18 (9th Cir. 1981). 
73. Id. at 23. In Weii, a mutual fund shareholder who had suffered substantial losses 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reasoned that 
where former rather than present stock owners are involved, the Garner 
holding and policy rationale do not apply.14 Likewise, in In re Dayco 
Corp.,75 the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Ohio, following the Fifth Circuit's lead, required a showing of substantial 
need, undue hardship, or both before plaintiffs in a derivative action 
could obtain access to the work product,of the corporation's attorneys.16 
Nevertheless, courts continue to pay lip service to Garner, while finding 
in most cases that the requirements for application of the Garner ration-
ale have not been met. 77 
Although the Garner decision remains viable, corporate counsel 
must be alert to the possibility that, in an appropriate case, a trial court 
will refuse to recognize an attorney-client privilege for communications 
between the corporation and its attorneys in shareholder or derivative 
suits. This possibility should be anticipated, particularly if the circum-
stances favoring disclosure, as set forth in Garner, are present. To maxi-
mize the corporation's chances of prevailing on a claim of privilege, 
careful documentation of the involvement of counsel and the litigation-
related purposes must be maintained. 
2. Corporate Housekeeping 
Another area of controversy in recent years has been the extent to 
which the fruits of in-house corporate investigations into suspected em-
ployee wrongdoing are discoverable. During the 1970's, allegations of 
improper payments for overseas contracts, political "slush funds," and 
other types of sub rosa conduct among corporate employees led to the 
widespread practice of retaining outside counsel or accounting firms, or 
establishing an in-house committee, to determine the nature and extent 
of wrongdoing. Such committees often confidentially interview employ-
ees, review corporate records, and issue reports or memoranda summa-
rizing their findings and conclusions. In subsequent litigation, 
filed suit against the fund and certain of its officers and directors, alleging violations 
of numerous securities laws. During the course of discovery, the plaintiff attempted 
to obtain answers to interrogatories concerning communications between officers of 
the fund and corporate counsel retained to assure compliance with state "Blue Sky" 
laws. Id. at 21-22. 
74. Id. at 23. The court reasoned that Garner was inapplicable in cases where former 
shareholders sought damages on their own behalf, because corporate attorneys act 
for the corporation and its present shareholders. 
75. 99 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1983). This case involved a shareholders' derivative ac-
tion alleging securities violations in the form of phantom commissions paid to a 
broker on the basis of nonexistent overseas contracts. The plaintiffs moved to com-
pel production of a "Report of Counsel to the Special Review Committee of the 
Board of Directors of the Dayco Corporation," prepared by the committee and re-
tained counsel in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 618 n.1. 
76. Id. at 621. 
77. See Lewis, Garner Is Alive and Well in Securities Litigation, 69 A.B.A. J. 903 
(1983). 
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corporations have attempted, with varying degrees of success, to claim 
that the attorney-client privilege shields these materials from discoveryJ8 
In Upjohn Co. v. United States,79 the Supreme Court held that the 
attorney-client privilege protected the reports of an in-house corporate 
committee from IRS subpoena. Upjohn has been followed by the lower 
federal courts. In Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc. v. Lemay,80 the 
plaintiff corporation hired a litigation consultant to investigate violations 
of employment contracts and wrongful appropriation of business infor-
mation allegedly perpetrated by former employees. The defendants 
sought a ruling that would have allowed them to depose the consultant 
about his conversations with in-house counsel. Applying Upjohn, the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that 
the consultant's conversations with in-house counsel were protected from 
discovery by the corporation's attorney-client privilege.81 The court 
made it clear, however, that the attorney-client privilege did not preclude 
discovery of the consultant's knowledge of the underlying facts; only the 
contents of conversations or other communications with counsel are 
protected. 82 
In re Dayco Corp. 83 similarly involved the proposed discovery of a 
report by an in-house committee investigating improper employee con-
duct.84 A "Special Review Committee" comprised of the corporation's 
board of directors and outside counsel conducted an investigation into 
Dayco's involvement with improper payment of commissions for nonex-
istent overseas contracts. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio held that the report containing the committee's 
findings and conclusions was protected by the attorney-client privilege, 
the work product immunity doctrine, or both.85 Furthermore, the court 
held that despite persuasive arguments to the contrary, the privileges had 
not been waived or overcome by a showing of substantial need and undue 
hardship pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3).86 The 
court noted that the individuals interviewed by the committee were avail-
able for the plaintiffs to depose and that discovery procedures insured the 
78. See, e.g., In re Dayco Corp., 99 F.R.D. at 618; Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 97 
F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (internal investigation concerning the preparation 
of allegedly libelous documentary); Weinschel, Corporate Employee Interviews and 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 12 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 873 (1971). 
79. 449 U.S. 383 (1981). For a discussion of Upjohn, see supra notes 40-48 and accom-
panying text. 
80. 89 F.R.D. 410 (S.D. Ohio 1981). 
81. Id. at 415. 
82.Id. 
83. 99 F.R.D. 616 (S.D. Ohio 1983). For a discussion of the facts involved in In re 
Dayco Corp., see supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text. 
84. Id. at 618. 
85. Id. at 621. 
86. Id. at 620-21. The court found that because the report was protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine, the Garner good cause 
balancing test should be replaced by the stricter substantial need test. Id. at 621. 
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production of company documents underlying the report. 87 
In In re International Systems & Controls Corp. Securities Litiga-
tion,88 a corporation established a "special audit committee" of in-
dependent directors who hired a law firm and an accounting firm to 
investigate alleged "sensitive payments" to foreign nationals in connec-
tion with contract negotiations. The Fifth Circuit held that binders con-
taining information developed during 'the committee's special review 
were prima facie protected under the work product immunity doctrine. 89 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit refused to ex-
tend Garner to work product materials and held that there had been no 
showing of an ongoing crime or fraud sufficient to overcome the immu-
nity accorded work product. 90 The court of appeals remanded the case to 
the district court, noting that for the binders to be produced the plaintiff 
must make a particularized showing that the equivalent of the subpoe-
naed work product materials could not be obtained elsewhere.91 
C. Disclosures to the SEC 
As noted previously,92 conversations and documents must be kept 
confidential if the client wishes to preserve its right to assert the attorney-
client privilege or work product immunity for such communication. In 
the context of publicly held corporations, this principle poses a question 
that has been the subject of considerable litigation and dispute: To what 
extent does voluntary disclosure of privileged information to government 
agencies waive the privilege in subsequent litigation? 
Courts ruling on this question have reached conflicting decisions re-
garding the effect of agency disclosure on evidentiary privileges. One line 
of cases, citing the overriding public policy of encouraging full coopera-
tion with and disclosure to federal agencies, holds that a party's volun-
tary disclosure of privileged information to the SEC does not constitute a 
waiver of the privilege in subsequent litigation.93 The trend in recent 
cases, however, is for courts to find that disclosure to federal agencies 
87.Id. 
88. 91 F.R.D. 552 (S.D. Tex. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1983). 
89. 693 F.2d at 1238-39. Although the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's deter-
mination that the material was "prepared in anticipation of litigation," it held that 
the Garner test was erroneously applied. Id. 
90. Id. at 1239-42. 
91. Id. at 1240-41. 
92. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
93. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 13, 1979,478 F. Supp. 368, 372-73 (E.D. 
Wis. 1979) (IRS subpoena to company attorneys seeking report disclosed informally 
to SEC of internal investigation of questionable payments quashed; witnesses inter-
viewed were available to give grand jury testimony and court did not want to dis-
courage cooperation with SEC); Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679, 688 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (securities fraud suit in which attorneys for real estate investment 
trust were deposed and their documents sought; documents had been supplied vol-
untarily to informal, non public SEC investigation to which defendant was not a 
party). 
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waives the privilege. Courts that find waiver under these circumstances 
cite the unfairness of permitting a corporation selectively to waive its 
privilege, disclosing the information when it is in the corporation's inter-
est to do so, and withholding that information when it is not.94 Still other 
decisions have attempted to find a middle ground, permitting a corpora-
tion to "reserve" the privilege or to make a "limited waiver" in its disclo-
sures to federal agencies by express reservation of rights.95 
A few representative decisions illustrate these positions. In Schnell 
v. Schnall,96 the defendant in a derivative suit appealed a magistrate's 
ruling that compelled it to produce the transcript of its attorney's volun-
tary testimony before the SEC. The United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, citing the "paramount" value of cooper-
ation with the SEC, refused to enter a disclosure order and held that the 
corporation had not waived its attorney-client privilege.97 
Similarly, in In re LTV Securities Litigation,98 shareholders sued the 
corporation, certain officers, and the corporation's accountants alleging 
accounting manipulations. The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Texas held that materials generated by a "special 
officer" and committee appointed by the corporation to implement an 
SEC consent decree, as well as materials generated by corporate attor-
neys in the course of an internal investigation, were privileged under both 
the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine. 99 
94. In re Subpoenas Duces Tecum to Fulbright & Jaworski, 99 F.R.D. 582, 588-89 
(D.D.C. 1983), a./f'd, 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also In re Sealed Case, 676 
F.2d 793,807, 817-18, 822-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (investigative counsel's compliance 
with voluntary disclosure program through submission to the SEC of its reports 
waived work product immunity); Maryville Academy v. Loeb Rhoades & Co., 559 
F. Supp. 79 (N.D. III. 1982) (disclosure of privileged information sought in sub-
poena constituted a complete waiver). In the Fulbright & Jaworski case, the corpo-
ration voluntarily released the product of its law firm's investigation of illegal 
overseas payments to the SEC "in confidence." The court nevertheless found waiver 
based on the SEC's refusal to accept the law firm's unilateral designation of the 
material as "confidential." 99 F.R.D. at 585. In re Sealed Case involved the investi-
gative counsel's report of a company's illegal overseas payments. Citing the disclo-
sure of the report pursuant to the SEC's voluntary disclosure program, the court of 
appeals held that any privilege had been waived. 676 F.2d at 824. The plaintiffs in 
Maryville were granted access to documents prepared by Loeb Rhoades & Co.'s 
counsel that had been turned over to the SEC. The district court emphasized that 
confidentiality had not been sought for the documents, despite the SEC's specific 
warning that the documents would be subject to public release under the Freedom 
of Information Act. 559 F. Supp. at 8-9. 
95. Diversified Indus., Inc. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978) (en banc); 
Teachers Ins. & Annuity Assoc. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638, 
644-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
96. 550 F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). 
97. Id. at 652-53. 
98. 89 F.R.D. 595 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Certain LTV shareholders sued the corporation, 
its subsidiary, and various corporate employees and agents alleging conspiracy to 
defraud shareholders by overvaluing inventories. 
99. Id. at 601-02, 614-18. Acknowledging that special investigative counsel are an "in-
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In Byrnes v. IDS Realty Trust,IOO the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York held that a corporation's disclosures to 
the SEC for purposes of a non public informal investigation did not waive 
the privilege as to a plaintiff not a party to the SEC proceeding. 101 
More recent decisions, however, have reached the opposite result. In 
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Fulbright & Jaworski,102 the District of 
Columbia Circuit upheld a trial court's ruling that voluntary disclosure 
to the SEC constitutes a complete waiver of the attorney-client privilege 
and work product immunity doctrine.103 The defendants in shareholder 
class action and derivative suits had disclosed to the SEC, pursuant to 
the agency's voluntary disclosure program, the results of an outside law 
firm's investigation of improper overseas payments. The investigators' fi-
nal report, as well as notes taken by lawyers during the course of the 
investigation, were submitted to the SEC in an effort to secure 1eniency 
and to forestall formal SEC investigation and litigation. I04 Disclosure to 
the SEC resulted in the waiver of both the attorney-client privilege and 
the work product immunity. lOS 
The Fulbright & Jaworski decision rested on three grounds: (1) dis-
closure to the SEC was inconsistent with maintaining the privilege; 
(2) the defendants in the shareholder class action and the derivative suit 
had no reasonable basis for believing the SEC would keep the data confi-
dential; and (3) a finding of waiver was consistent with the policies be-
hind evidentiary privileges. The "selective waiver" the defendants 
sought to assert would abuse the privilege unfairly.106 This rationale has 
been followed in other recent decisions including In re Sealed Case,107 in 
which the District of Columbia Circuit held that waiver of the privilege 
occurs when a corporation participates in the SEC's voluntary disclosure 
program. 
A compromise position was outlined by the Eighth Circuit in Diver-
sified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith.lOs The court held that disclosure of the 
results of an in-house "slush fund" investigation pursuant to subpoena in 
a separate, non public SEC investigation constituted only a limited waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege. 109 To hold otherwise, the court observed, 
creasingly common element of consent decrees," the LTV court recognized a hybrid 
privilege tailored to the special officer's role in an SEC consent decree. Id. at 620-22. 
100. 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
101. Id. at 687-89. 
102. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
103. Id. at 1369-72. 
104. Id. at 1370. The SEC's voluntary disclosure program "promises wrongdoers more 
lenient treatment and the chance to avoid formal investigation. . . in return for 
thorough self-investigation and complete disclosure of the results to the SEC." Id. at 
1369. 
105. Id. at 1367, 1369-72, 1374-75. 
106.Id. 
107. 676 F.2d 793, 817-23 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
108. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978) (en bane). 
109. The Eighth Circuit derived its concept of "limited waiver" from two earlier 
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would thwart the use of independent counsel to investigate matters on 
behalf of the corporation and produce a result that is at odds with the 
corporation's interest in obtaining advice that may help it protect the 
interests of its investors and customers. 11D 
The ramifications of such a "limited waiver" are set forth in Teach-
ers Insurance & Annuity Association v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., III 
which contains an explicit exposition of the limited waiver doctrine. The 
issue in Teachers was whether a corporate pension fund waived the right 
to assert the attorney-client privilege with respect to documents turned 
over to the SEC in response to an agency subpoena. The United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that it 
would hold that the pension fund had waived its attorney-client privilege 
only if the documents had been provided to the SEC without reserva-
tion. 112 The court noted that an express, contemporaneous reservation or 
stipulation indicates that the disclosing party has made "some effort" to 
preserve the privacy of the privileged communication. The stipulation 
also would show that the privilege was not being abused through a know-
ing decision to waive the rule's protection in one set of circumstances and 
later to retract the decision when it becomes disadvantageous in subse-
quent litigation. The court therefore concluded that if documents were 
provided to the SEC under a protective order, stipulation, or other ex-
press reservation of the producing party's claim of privilege, no waiver 
would be implied. I 13 
Teachers represents a well reasoned compromise position on waiver 
of privilege in the context of regulatory agency disclosures. It has not 
gained a following outside the jurisdiction of the Southern District of 
New York. In the Fulbright & Jaworski case, the District of Columbia 
Circuit refused to find that the corporation maintained its privilege de-
spite disclosure of confidential data to the SEC. The court held that let-
ters exchanged between the Fulbright firm and the SEC warranted no 
decisons, Bucks County Bank & Trust Co. v. Stork, 297 F. Supp. 1122, 1123-24 (D. 
Hawaii 1969) (testimony of client at hearing seeking return of illegally seized prop-
erty not a "general waiver" of attorney-client privilege) and United States v. Good-
man, 289 F.2d 256, 259 (4th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 368 U.S. 14 (1961) 
(waiver of privilege against self-incrimination by disclosure to federal agents did not 
constitute waiver of privilege asserted by witness in subsequent tax court proceeding 
brought by employer seeking redetermination of tax deficiencies). Neither of the 
cases cited provide a principled explanation of the concept of limited waiver of testi-
monial privileges. The Diversified court supported its limited waiver finding with the 
comment that "Diversified disclosed these documents in a separate and non public 
SEC investigation." 572 F.2d at 611. 
110. Id. 
Ill. 521 F. Supp. 638 (S.D.N. Y. 1981). Teachers involved an action by a corporate pen-
sion fund, which held certain stock warrants, for damages arising from an insurance 
company's failure to honor the warrants. The insurance company moved to compel 
the pension fund to produce documents it had turned over to the SEC in response to 
an agency SUbpoena. Id. at 639. 
112. Id. at 646. 
113. Id. 
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expectation of confidentiality for the materials made available to the 
agency. 1 14 The mere assertion by the Fulbright firm that the submissions 
were made in confidence, without a waiver of any privilege against dis-
closure, did not protect the privilege, at least absent evidence that the 
SEC had agreed to these terms. ll5 
In light of the Teachers opinion, when disclosure of confidential 
materials to the SEC is anticipated, counsel for corporations should as-
sert the attorney-client privilege and, in instances where it is applicable, 
the work product immunity doctrine, and obtain assurances of confiden-
tiality from the SEC before turning over attorney-client or work product 
materials. Otherwise, the corporation runs a serious risk of waiving the 
privilege when client confidences or work product material are voluntar-
ily submitted. When a corporation is deciding whether to participate in 
voluntary disclosure programs, corporate counsel should consider this 
risk. 
1. Disclosure to Outside Auditors 
Under the Supreme Court's case-by-case approach, corporations 
generally have not fared well in their attempt to shield legal advice incor-
porated in their tax and accounting records. This has been particularly 
true with respect to litigation with the Internal Revenue Service. 
In United States v. El Paso Co., 116 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit upheld an IRS request for a corporate tax-
payer's "tax-pool" analysis of contingent liability for additional taxes. ll7 
The analysis was prepared to insure that the corporation had set aside on 
its balance sheet a sufficient amount to cover contingent tax liability. The 
corporate taxpayer claimed that the analysis was protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege. The Fifth Circuit rejected this contention, noting 
that the tax-pool analysis was revealed to outside corporate auditors as 
part of the outside auditors' annual audit for verification of the corpora-
tion's financial statements. llS The court therefore concluded that the 
analysis lacked the requisite confidentiality of privileged attorney-client 
communications. 1 19 
The corporate taxpayer's contention that the work product immu-
nity doctrine also shielded the information similarly was dismissed. The 
Fifth Circuit observed that the tax-pool analysis did not appear to have 
been prepared in anticipation of litigation, noting that the function of the 
auditors' work product was simply to support a figure on a financial bal-
114. 738 F.2d 1367 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
115. /d. at 1372-74. 
116. 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1982). 
117. A "tax pool" is a noncurrent tax account charged to a corporation's balance sheet to 
cover contingent, deferred tax liability. generally constituting the spread between 
maximum corporate tax rates and the actual rate at which the corporation's taxes 
have been calculated. [d. at 534-35. 
118. [d. at 540. 
119. [d. at 542. 
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ance sheet. 120 The purpose of the tax-pool analysis-to comply with SEC 
regulations-struck the court as carrying "much more the aura of daily 
business than . . . of corporate combat." 121 
Similar results have been reached in other cases. The United States 
Supreme Court appears to have endorsed the El Paso approach in United 
States v. Arthur Young & Co. 122 As in El Paso, the Supreme Court found 
that a "compliance assurance" audit by an independent accounting firm 
did not enjoy work product protection. 123 In light of Arthur Young and 
El Paso, the utility of the work product provided by a public accounting 
firm must be considered carefully before a decision is made to retain the 
accounting firm for investigatory work or otherwise to assist counsel at 
trial. 
2. Inadvertent Disclosure 
Considerable litigation has developed concerning the issue of 
whether "waiver" of the attorney-client privilege or of work product im-
munity results from the inadvertent or accidental disclosure of protected 
information. In the context of corporate litigation, large-scale document 
production sometimes results in the accidental delivery of a privileged 
document to an opponent. Under such circumstances, the issue becomes 
whether a waiver occurred and, if so, the extent to which the attorney-
client privilege or work product immunity is waived. 
In Chubb Integrated Systems v. National Bank, 124 the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia recently held that the inad-
vertent disclosure of privileged information during an overseas document 
production constituted a complete waiver of evidentiary privilege. 125 Vol-
untary disclosure to an adversary, although unintentional, was held to 
waive both the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity. The 
court observed that the attorney-client privilege and work product im-
munity "should be available only at the traditional price: a litigant must 
maintain genuine confidentiality."126 
In an attempt to avoid an unduly harsh result under similar circum-
stances, the court in Champion International Corp. v. International Paper 
Co. 127 found a waiver, but limited the scope of the waiver. The plaintiff in 
a patent infringement action inadvertently produced documents reflect-
ing attorney-client communications. 128 Defendants then filed a motion to 
compel production of all other documents related to the infringement 
action that were withheld by the plaintiff on the basis of attorney-client 
120. Id. at 544. 
121. Id. 
122. 104 S. Ct. 1495 (1984). 
123. Id. at 1504; see supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text. 
124. 103 F.R.D. 52 (D.D.C. 1984). 
125. Id. at 67-68. 
126. Id. at 67. 
127. 486 F. Supp. 1328 (N.D. Ga. 1980). 
128. Id. at 1330-31. 
272 Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 15 
privilege, arguing that the privilege had been waived. 129 The court ac-
knowledged that the voluntary disclosure of a privileged communication 
ordinarily operates as waiver of the privilege as to other privileged com-
munications concerning the same subject. 130 The court, however, citing 
overriding considerations of fairness, found that the accidental release of 
a small number of privileged documents "in the course of exhaustive dis-
covery and in the spirit of openness, cooperation and reason" constituted 
a waiver only as to the documents actually produced, not to other privi-
leged material. 131 
Document production during the course of litigation presents an ob-
vious risk of inadvertent production of privileged material. Attorney con-
trol and supervision of such document production is essential to avoid 
inadvertent waiver of important evidentiary privileges. If, however, a 
document is inadvertently disclosed, counsel must rely on the public pol-
icy underlying the Champion decision and argue that an accidental act 
performed in a good faith attempt to comply with discovery should not 
carry the penalty of a complete subject-matter privilege waiver. 
V. EFFECTIVE PRESERVATION AND ASSERTION OF THE 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK 
PRODUCT IMMUNITY DOCTRINE 
The key to successful assertion of the attorney-client privilege and 
the work product immunity doctrine in the corporate setting lies in antic-
ipating and avoiding problems. Corporate counsel must establish appro-
priate policies regarding employees' contacts with in-house and outside 
counsel concerning matters that may lead to litigation. Records of con-
tacts between corporate employees and corporate counsel must reflect 
that the purpose of a particular conference was to seek legal, as opposed 
to business, advice. 
A. Confidentiality 
In-house counsel's records and files must remain confidential. Mem-
oranda should be distributed only on a need-to-know basis, and under no 
circumstances should sensitive information be disseminated to persons 
outside the privilege. 132 When counsel anticipates litigation during the 
preparation of a memorandum, record, or report, the document should 
reflect that fact. Information gathered for use by attorneys should indi-
cate on its face that the information was gathered at counsel's request. At 
129. /d. at 1329-30. 
130. Id. at 1332. 
131. Id. at 1333. 
132. See, e.g., Western Fuels Ass'n v. Burlington N.R.R., 102 F.R.D. 201, 203 (D. Wyo. 
1984 ) (disclosure of work product to friendly litigant in a related case is not beyond 
the scope of the privilege); Barr Marine Prod. Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 84 F.R.D. 
631,634 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (privilege waived if communication made in the presence 
of a third party). 
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least one court has refused to hold sensitive corporate memoranda im-
mune under the work product immunity doctrine merely because the liti-
gation-related purposes of the memoranda were not apparent on their 
faces.l33 
B. Early Assertion 
The SEC cases teach that evidentiary privileges should be asserted 
at the outset of contact with governmental agencies and investigators and 
reiterated on a frequent basis, even if cooperation with the agency is an-
ticipated. If possible, commitments of confidentiality should be obtained 
in writing from the agency prior to disclosure of confidential informa-
tion. Litigants should seek a protective order or a written stipulation re-
serving the privileges in the event that privileged information is 
communicated to regulatory agencies. If such an agreement is unavail-
able, the corporation may wish to reevaluate the benefits of voluntary 
cooperation in light of potential subsequent evidentiary ramifications. 
C Internal Investigations 
If a corporate "housekeeping" committee needs to interview corpo-
rate employees concerning possible violations of law, all the employees 
interviewed must be made aware of the litigation-related purposes of 
their contacts with inside and outside counsel. Through the use of this 
procedure, a corporation will be able to meet the requirements of Upjohn 
for asserting the attorney-client privilege. In the process of conducting an 
in-house investigation, the corporation must avoid publicizing or making 
testimonial use of the details of the investigation; otherwise, such actions 
may constitute waiver.134 Attorneys must not provide expert or other 
witnesses with copies of work product material or attorney-client com-
munications in preparation for their testimony. Any such evidentiary use 
of privileged material is apt to result in a finding of waiver. 
D. Fraud or Misconduct 
Finally, an attorney must be alert to the possibility that a client is 
involved in fraud or other criminal misconduct. Corporate attorneys 
should be aware that any communications involved in the perpetration of 
ongoing fraud or criminal activity will not be privileged. If the existence 
of such communications becomes known to the government or to an op-
ponent in civil litigation, the communications will not be protected. 135 
An attorney's lack of awareness regarding a criminal purpose underlying 
a corporation's contacts with him makes no difference in applying the 
133. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy, 102 F.R.D. 1, 9 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). 
134. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983); Computer Network Corp. v. 
Spohler, 95 F.R.D. 500 (D.D.C. 1982). 
135. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983,731 F.2d 1032 (2d 
Cir. 1984); United States v. King, 536 F. Supp. 253 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
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attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine. 136 
Neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product immunity 
doctrine protects communications made in pursuit of a crime or fraud. 
E. Appellate Review of Privilege Rulings 
To protect the interests of a client in the confidentiality of materials, 
obtaining appellate review of an adverse privilege ruling is essential. Re-
fusal to produce the material without seeking appellate review subjects 
the attorney and his client to significant punishment, including contempt 
of court. 137 In addition, failure to seek precompliance appellate review of 
a disclosure order may prevent any effective review. Once privileged ma-
terial is disclosed, its confidentiality as a practical matter irretrievably is 
lost. 
Discovery orders are interlocutory in nature. 138 In federal courts, 
orders denying the application of a privilege can be appealed only 
through certification of the question by the trial court or by means of an 
extraordinary writ. 139 Prompt and consistent assertion of a privilege and 
maintaining the confidentiality of the privileged material pending appel-
late review are necessary prerequisites to obtaining appellate review of 
discovery orders. Even if appellate review is obtained, reviewing courts 
are reluctant to overturn the reasonable exercise of a trial court's discre-
tion in applying the privileges. l40 Thus, invoking the jurisdiction of a 
court of appeals to protect confidential material must be viewed as a "last 
ditch" measure which, despite counsel's best efforts, is not likely to 
succeed. 
The standard for granting a writ of mandamus is a strict one. Unless 
the trial court's discovery order exceeded its jurisdiction or amounted to 
an abuse of discretion, mandamus will not lie. 141 Some appellate courts, 
such as those in California, refuse to allow immediate review of decisions 
granting discovery.142 Only refusals to permit discovery generally are 
136. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Sept. 15, 1983, 731 F.2d 1032, 
1038 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 
1977). 
137. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(I); see also Southern R.R. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119 (5th 
Cir. 1968) (corporation refusing compliance with court order to produce allegedly 
privileged documents was held in contempt). 
138. See, e.g., Montgomery County Council v. Kaslow, 235 Md. 45, 200 A.2d 184 (1964) 
(circuit court order compelling the giving of depositions held interlocutory and non-
appealable); Smiley v. Atkinson, 12 Md. App. 543, 280 A.2d 277 (1971) (denial of 
motion for physical exam held interlocutory), affd, 265 Md. 129, 287 A.2d 770 
(1972). 
139. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2006, at 29-
36 (1970). 
140. See Grinnel Corp. v. Hackett, 511 F.2d 595 (1st Cir. 1975) (discovery order did not 
involve such "clear usurpation" of judicial power to justify writ of mandamus), cert. 
denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1976). 
141. EEOC V. Carter Carburetor Div., 577 F.2d 43 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. 
ACF Indus., Inc., Carter Carburetor Div. V. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081 (1971). 
142. See, e.g., Brown V. Superior Court, 137 Ariz. 327, 670 P.2d 725 (1983) (trial court 
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considered appealable before trial. I43 Other courts require a discovery 
issue to have significant effects beyond the immediate litigation before 
they will grant review pursuant to a writ of mandamus. 144 It is therefore 
clear that an attorney's best efforts to protect the privilege must be made 
early, at the trial court level, in view of appellate court reluctance to 
review discovery orders. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Attorneys for corporations have a duty to protect the attorney-client 
privilege and work product immunity on behalf of their corporate clients. 
In the corporate setting, protecting the attorney-client privilege and work 
product immunity is not always a simple matter. Confusion and unpre-
dictability are reflected in court rulings on attorney-client privilege and 
work product immunity. Furthermore, the Upjohn case-by-case analysis 
of the attorney-client privilege and the work product immunity doctrine 
has not provided clear standards to guide corporate counsel. Cases find-
ing waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work product immunity 
similarly should affect significantly corporate decisions to voluntarily 
comply with governmental investigations. It therefore is impossible to 
guarantee a client favorable decisions with respect to the attorney-client 
privilege and work product immunity when these protective devices are 
asserted in civil litigation and enforcement proceedings. Nevertheless, by 
utilizing basic principles of confidentiality and documentation in all con-
tact with corporate directors, officers, and employees, an attorney can 
improve greatly the odds that a claim of attorney-client privilege or work 
product immunity asserted with respect to efforts on behalf of his corpo-
rate client will be upheld. 
has broad discretion as to discovery which will not be overturned absent clear 
abuse); Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 785, 647 
P.2d 86, 183 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1982) (appellate court must conclude that answers 
sought by a given line of questions cannot as a reasonable possibility lead to discov-
erable information); Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161, 171, 
465 P.2d 854, 861, 84 Cal. Rptr. 718, 725 (1970) (liberal policies underlying discov-
ery counsel against overturning the trial court's discretion granting discovery). 
143. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 161,465 P.2d 854, 84 Cal. Rptr. 
718 (1970). 
144. In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980); In re Attorney General of the United 
States, 596 F.2d 58, 63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Socialist Workers' Party V. 
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